Suchergebnisse für Informationsrechte des Verwaltungsrates

Informationskonzept im neuen Aktienrecht

The information asymmetry between shareholders and managers calls for the implementation of an efficient information concept within stock corporations. In the course of the Swiss Stock Corporation Reform of 2020, the former information concept was partially revised. This article takes a critical look at the revised provisions and puts them in context.

Kantonalbanken im Spannungsfeld von Political Governance und Corporate Governance

Like the other banks, the cantonal banks are facing the challenges of increasing regulation, digitalisation and the persistently low interest rate environment, and are exposed to the accompanying competitive and margin pressure. They have to virtually reinvent their business models and themselves in order to secure their positions as future-oriented financial service providers in their regions…

Relationship Agreements zwischen Vertragsfreiheit und zwingendem Aktienrecht

Relationship agreements between listed companies and large shareholders have gained in popularity over the past years. Relationship agreements cover such topics as the shareholder’s representation on the board of directors, voting at shareholder meetings, the shareholder’s right to receive information from the company, and exit provisions (e.g., lock-up and standstill undertakings). From the…

Editorial

Die SZW-Aktienrechtstagung 2019 fragte nach dem «richtigen» Aktienrecht für das 21. Jahrhundert. Im Zentrum standen dabei die laufende Aktienrechtsrevision und technologische Entwicklungen. Die aus…

Le droit à l’information de l’administrateur et sa mise en œuvre judiciaire

This article deals with the right to information and ­inspection of a member of the board of directors (Article 715a of the Swiss Code of Obligations, CO) and the possibility, recently acknowledged by the Federal Tribunal, to raise a claim based on such right. The implementing of Article 715a CO in court gives rise to a number of questions. Often, time is of the essence and a court decision may…

«Gute Praxis» der Unternehmensführung: Was gehört sich und was funktioniert?

The legal means influencing the practice of the board are very largely the rules on director’s liability. The case law of the Federal Court has recently made these rules more efficient and more foreseeable through the development of a Swiss version of the Business Judgement Rule (BJR). They could be further improved if the Courts were to integrate Corporate Governance models in the BJR condition…

Funktion(en) des Aktienrechts – vom Organisationsrecht zum Katalysator der Gesellschaftspolitik?

Swiss Corporate Law (Articles 620 et seq. of the Swiss Code of Obligations) is undergoing permanent changes since the 19^th century. Originally, these articles provided the legal basis for structuring and organizing corporations in the most efficient way – not more; therefore, the main focus was placed on protection of investors (i.e. the legal protection for both shareholders and creditors). Over…

Gerichtliche Durchsetzung der Informationsrechte nach Art. 715a OR

Mit Gesuch vom 29. Juni 2016 stellte A. (Gesuchsteller und Beschwerdeführer) als Verwaltungsrat der B. AG (Gesuchs- und Beschwerdegegnerin) beim Kantonsgerichtspräsidium Obwalden unter anderem das…

Vorbereitung und Durchsetzung von Aktionärsklagen: Wie kann die Informationsasymmetrie überwunden werden?

In order to improve the enforcement of directors’ liability in solvent companies, it is necessary to improve the access of shareholders to information in order to prepare a derivative suit. The Swiss company law revision project of 2016 provides such improvements by lowering the conditions under which a special audit can be appointed by the court (art. 697a seq. CO). However, the applicants…

Rechenschaft und Transparenz als zentraler Teil der Governance oder als Selbstzweck?

The title of the essay is: “Accountability and Transparency as a function of governance or a function which ends in themselves?” Without transparency good corporate governance is not possible, since only informed decisions are dutiful decisions. Both, the general assembly of shareholders and the board must make decisions which are only possible if transparency is given. For example, for most…