Résultats de recherche pour Comply-or-explain-Prinzip

Bonus als Risiko – Zur Regulierung der variablen Vergütung von Bankorganen

The experience with the Credit Suisse crisis of confidence has once again shown that compensation systems are of considerable importance for the risk management of financial institutions. Inappropriate risks and wrong incentives can endanger the substance and profitability of a bank and thus its stability. This article focuses on the regulation of variable compensation of bank boards and analyzes…

Neuausrichtung des «Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance» auf den Wandel der Zeit

The «Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance», which was first published in 2002 and has since been revised several times, has become the most important guideline for good corporate governance in Switzerland and is widely accepted because it shows practical solutions based on expertise and experience. It compensates for its non-binding nature and lack of legal legitimacy, so to speak…

Geschäftsherrenhaftung im Konzernverhältnis?

On November 29, 2020, the Corporate Responsibil­ity-Initiative failed in the referendum by a majority of the cantons. The debate on the Corporate Responsibility Initiative and the indirect counter-proposal of the Swiss Parliament focused on the question of the extent to which Swiss companies should be held liable for the activities of the companies they control in the area of human rights and…

Nichtfinanzielle Berichterstattung nach dem Gegenvorschlag zur Konzernverantwortungsinitiative und ihre Bedeutung für den Finanzsektor

The financial market and its players play a key role in the pursuit of a sustainable economic system. If capital flows are specifically directed toward sustainable products and services, financial market participants can make a significant contribution to a resource-efficient economy. A key prerequisite for the regulatory control of the achievement of sustainability goals is the reporting of…

Good Corporate Governance: Von der Zielsetzung zur Unternehmens­organisation – am Beispiel des neuen Aktienrechts

The authors start out by noting that the term and discussion around corporate governance developed from a technical designation without content to a concept of «good» corporate governance that increasingly prescribes the ways, not the goals of corporate governance. Likewise, the question whether a corporate governance system is good or bad is not measured in light of its efficiency in achieving…

Was ist «wirtschafts-verträgliches» Aktienrecht?

The last comprehensive overhaul of Swiss corporation law dates from 1991. The revised law was intended to provide more transparency, improve shareholder rights and set goalposts with respect to corporate organization and corporate powers. But the 1991 corporation law fell short of international standards, especially for listed companies. Numerous pieces of legislation and self-regulatory…

Kernfragen der Aktienrechtsrevision

On November 23, 2016, the Federal Council published its proposal for a revised law on companies limited by shares. This article deals with four key aspects of the proposed revision. First, it addresses the proposed amendments regar­ding the capital structure. The authors thereby focus on the rules for capital increases, decreases and the possibility to introduce a so called «capital band». Secon…

Das Finanzmarktaufsichtsrecht vom vierten Quartal 2015 bis ins vierte Quartal 2016

Die «Too-big-to-fail» (TBTF)-Bestimmungen des Bankengesetzes sind seit dem 1. März 2012 in Kraft. Mit Art. 52 BankG hat der Gesetzgeber sichergestellt, dass kontinuierlich ein waches Auge auf die Regulierung systemrelevanter Institute fällt. Da die beiden Grossbanken im Vergleich zum Schweizer Bruttoinlandprodukt deutlich grösser sind als die zwei grössten Banken in anderen Ländern¹ und…

Proxy Advisory – eine Standortbestimmung

With the growing interest of institutional investors in Swiss listed companies the influence of proxy advisors has also risen. This, in turn, has led to a wave of non-binding regulations or guidelines and, more recently, to proposals for binding statutory rules addressing those aspects of the proxy advisory industry which for years have been the target of international criticism. The author takes…

Proxy Advisors – Fluch oder Segen in der Corporate Governance?

The role of proxy advisors in the governance of listed companies has triggered criticism ranging from “box ticking” to “empty voting” and has sparked an intense debate on how to address these concerns. The author takes the view that – for the time being – proxy advisors are not a topic for the regulator. Many institutional investors owe their beneficiaries a fiduciary duty based on which they are…

Proxy Advisors: Risikolose Stimmenmacht mit Checklisten

Over the last ten years Proxy Advisors have continually enhanced their role as major players in shareholders’ meetings of Swiss public companies. In correlation with the ever increasing percentage of listed shares owned by Institutional Shareholders – 50%–70% and more in typical cases –, a power transfer is developing to advisors wielding factual voting clout without bearing investment risk.