Résultats de recherche pour Aktionärsdemokratie

Absage einzelner Traktanden einer GV oder einer GV insgesamt

Mit Schreiben vom 6. Mai 2020 lud der Verwaltungsrat (VR) der A AG (Beklagte, Beschwerdeführerin, nachfolgend: A AG) die Aktionäre zur ordentlichen Generalversammlung (GV) auf den 18. Juni 2020 ein…

Auskunfts- und Einsichtsrecht des Aktionärs – Durchzogene Bilanz der Aktienrechtsrevision

The revision of the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO) concerning the joint stock corporation – which will come into force on 1 January 2023 – substantially alters the shareholders’ rights to ask for information about the affairs of the company and to inspect its ledgers and files. Compared to the present legal situation, which only entitles a shareholder to obtain information during the course of a…

Corporate Governance et liberté d’organisation

The question of limits to contractual freedom in corporate law is intensively discussed in connection with corporate governance. In that context, the tension between authority and accountability of the board of directors and the best way to address this issue in corporate law are two of the most controversial topics. Over these last years, the trend in almost all jurisdictions has been to…

Good Corporate Governance: Von der Zielsetzung zur Unternehmens­organisation – am Beispiel des neuen Aktienrechts

The authors start out by noting that the term and discussion around corporate governance developed from a technical designation without content to a concept of «good» corporate governance that increasingly prescribes the ways, not the goals of corporate governance. Likewise, the question whether a corporate governance system is good or bad is not measured in light of its efficiency in achieving…

Generalversammlungen von AG: «Landsgemeinden» oder «Chatrooms»?

Digitalization will cause a fundamental change regarding general meetings of Swiss stock corporations. Currently, Swiss corporate law provides that shareholders must be physically present, or validly represented at a general meeting and may not participate in writing or by electronic means; the «COVID-19 regime», however, allows e.g. «cyber general meetings». The new Swiss law on corporations,…

Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown – Zur Rolle des Verwaltungsrates in schweizerischen Publikumsgesellschaften

The board of directors of a Swiss public company is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Shareholders breathe down directors’ necks with earnings expectations, but the results are delivered by an executive management under the board’s control rather than by the board itself. The executives who run the business on a day-to-day basis know the company better than the board. This allows them to…

Salär-Governance

2017 was a special year for Swiss listed companies. Several compensation reports met fierce resistance from shareholders and proxy advisors, and in one case, a binding vote on executive compensation was rejected. The 2017 proxy season has shown that shareholders do not appreciate compensation models in which osten­sibly pay and performance are not related. Also, the season has shown that over…

Vinkulierung an der Bruchstelle zwischen kotierter Gesellschaft und nicht kotierten Aktionären

This article contains a selective analysis of the current system of share transfer restrictions (Vinkulierung), in particular with regard to the scope of application of the relevant provisions in relation to direct and indirect investments in publicly held companies, that has raised public interest in connection with the “Sika”-case. The authors illustrate the current state of established…

Art. 704 OR und Minderheitenschutz: Eine aktienrechtliche ­Kurvendiskussion

Majority requirements for shareholder resolutions are an important element of minority protection in corporate law. Swiss learned writing ascribes such minority protecting effect to article 704(1) of the Code of Obligations (CO), which requires certain important shareholder resolutions to be taken by a supermajority of two thirds of votes represented and the absolute majority of capital represented.

Wer kontrolliert die Aktiengesellschaft?

In Switzerland as in other countries, there is a perennial debate relating to the question of who controls a listed company, and whose interests a corporation should serve: the largest shareholders, minority shareholders, or other stakeholders? And what is the influence of management or the recent phenomenon of proxy advisors on decision-making in listed companies? The author analyzes the issues…