Suchergebnisse für Aktionärsdemokratie

Absage einzelner Traktanden einer GV oder einer GV insgesamt

Mit Schreiben vom 6. Mai 2020 lud der Verwaltungsrat (VR) der A AG (Beklagte, Beschwerdeführerin, nachfolgend: A AG) die Aktionäre zur ordentlichen Generalversammlung (GV) auf den 18. Juni 2020 ein…

Salär-Governance

2017 was a special year for Swiss listed companies. Several compensation reports met fierce resistance from shareholders and proxy advisors, and in one case, a binding vote on executive compensation was rejected. The 2017 proxy season has shown that shareholders do not appreciate compensation models in which osten­sibly pay and performance are not related. Also, the season has shown that over…

Vinkulierung an der Bruchstelle zwischen kotierter Gesellschaft und nicht kotierten Aktionären

This article contains a selective analysis of the current system of share transfer restrictions (Vinkulierung), in particular with regard to the scope of application of the relevant provisions in relation to direct and indirect investments in publicly held companies, that has raised public interest in connection with the “Sika”-case. The authors illustrate the current state of established…

Wer kontrolliert die Aktiengesellschaft?

In Switzerland as in other countries, there is a perennial debate relating to the question of who controls a listed company, and whose interests a corporation should serve: the largest shareholders, minority shareholders, or other stakeholders? And what is the influence of management or the recent phenomenon of proxy advisors on decision-making in listed companies? The author analyzes the issues…

Stimmenmehrheit unter Verdacht: Wege und Irrwege im aktienrechtlichen Minderheitenschutz

Recent developments in the area of corporation law ­indicate a dichotomy between calls for more “shareholder democracy” and an increasing suspicion about “shareholders’ majority decisions”. Corporations have to date been governed following the model of “subjection of the minority to the majority”, with the steady approval of the courts. This guiding principle, which is at the core of a…

Stimmrechtsverhalten von institutionellen Anlegern, insbesondere ­Pensionskassen

The initiative against excessive remuneration gives additional powers to the general meeting of shareholders, in particular where the salaries of mangers are concern­ed. A less known novelty is that it also obliges some of the institutional investors, Swiss pension funds, to exercise their rights as shareholders in the “interests of their members” and to publicly communicate the manner in which…

Le principe d’immédiateté au sein de l’assemblée générale

Traditionally, the general meeting of shareholders was viewed as the ideal place where shareholders take their decisions based on the expression of their contradicting views. Today, the shareholders meeting is no longer a forum where shareholders exchange ideas, but a place where votes are registered and results are communicated. Shareholders take their decisions prior to the general meeting…

Proxy Advisors – Fluch oder Segen in der Corporate Governance?

The role of proxy advisors in the governance of listed companies has triggered criticism ranging from “box ticking” to “empty voting” and has sparked an intense debate on how to address these concerns. The author takes the view that – for the time being – proxy advisors are not a topic for the regulator. Many institutional investors owe their beneficiaries a fiduciary duty based on which they are…