Suchergebnisse für Interessenkonflikte im Verwaltungsrat

Informationskonzept im neuen Aktienrecht

The information asymmetry between shareholders and managers calls for the implementation of an efficient information concept within stock corporations. In the course of the Swiss Stock Corporation Reform of 2020, the former information concept was partially revised. This article takes a critical look at the revised provisions and puts them in context.

Neuausrichtung des «Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance» auf den Wandel der Zeit

The «Swiss Code of Best Practice for Corporate Governance», which was first published in 2002 and has since been revised several times, has become the most important guideline for good corporate governance in Switzerland and is widely accepted because it shows practical solutions based on expertise and experience. It compensates for its non-binding nature and lack of legal legitimacy, so to speak…

Insichgeschäfte von Mitgliedern des Verwaltungsrates

Die börsenkotierte Z. AG (Beschwerdegegnerin) hält in ihren Statuten fest, dass der Verwaltungsrat aus drei oder mehr Mitgliedern besteht. Dieser kann die Geschäftsführung nach Massgabe des…

Die Rolle der FINMA bei Vergütungen in Banken und Versicherungen

Compensation and remuneration schemes in financial institutions always have been, and still are, a hot potato. The past decade has been particularly eventful in terms of both regulation and supervision, not only in Switzerland, but also abroad. Against this backdrop, this article aims to discuss the role of the Swiss Financial Market Supervisory Authority, FINMA, with regard to compensation in…

Praktische Problemfelder und Lösungsansätze in Bezug auf die «FinTech»-Bewilligungsvoraussetzungen von Art. 1b BankG

The piece at hand addresses in depth the FinTech license according to art. 1b of the Swiss Banking Act (BA) that is in force since January 1^st 2019. The FinTech license provides for a new category of a regulatory status for FinTech institutions that do not offer typical banking activities, but whose business touches certain elements of banking. It aims to foster innovation in the financial market…

Der Organisationsmangel in der Aktiengesellschaft und die Ernennung eines Sachwalters nach Art. 731b OR

Die B. AG ist eine Aktiengesellschaft mit Sitz in Zug. Das Aktionariat der B. AG besteht aus dem Gesuchsteller und Beschwerdeführer A. mit einer Beteiligung von 48,33 Prozent und C. mit einer…

Aktienrechtliche Verantwortlichkeit: Zur gerichtlichen Prüfungsbefugnis im Anwendungsbereich der Business Judgment Rule (Zurückhaltungsregel)

In the context of directors’ and officers’ liability, the ­so-called Business Judgment Rule and its Swiss equivalent – which is also referred to as the Rule of Restraint (Zurückhaltungsregel) – aim to protect the exercise of discretion when making business decisions. According to the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, the judicial review of business decisions must be conducted with restraint if i) the…

Gedanken zum einstweiligen Rechtsschutz gegen pflichtwidriges Handeln von Verwaltungsräten

Swiss law does not allow for the challenge of resolutions taken by the board of directors of a corporation, and only in extreme cases they may be deemed null and void. However, according to a recent decision by the Swiss Federal Supreme Court, this does not exclude claims against a corporation to enforce statutory rights that were denied by the board of directors. Against the background of this…

Leuchttürme oder Untiefen?

Sometimes, courts must remain silent for many years on important questions, simply for lack of cases, until we find ourselves suddenly confronted with unexpected decisions. This happened with the possibilities corporations had to deal in their by-laws with blockage situa­tions in the shareholder meeting. The Federal Tribunal overturned last year a decades old rule enabling companies to attribute…

Stimmenmehrheit unter Verdacht: Wege und Irrwege im aktienrechtlichen Minderheitenschutz

Recent developments in the area of corporation law ­indicate a dichotomy between calls for more “shareholder democracy” and an increasing suspicion about “shareholders’ majority decisions”. Corporations have to date been governed following the model of “subjection of the minority to the majority”, with the steady approval of the courts. This guiding principle, which is at the core of a…