Suchergebnisse für collective dominant position

La banque et le créancier prêteur face à l’insolvabilité de l’emprunteur : moyens préventifs et curatifs

In a contractual relationship, a bank, or more generally a lender, on the one hand, and a borrower on the other, harmoniously blend, as long as the borrower complies with the repayments’ obligations arising from the loan agreement. However, in such an agreement, risk lies primarily on the lender. Indeed, as soon as the money has been made available, the lender takes the default’s risk. This…

Corporate Governance et liberté d’organisation

The question of limits to contractual freedom in corporate law is intensively discussed in connection with corporate governance. In that context, the tension between authority and accountability of the board of directors and the best way to address this issue in corporate law are two of the most controversial topics. Over these last years, the trend in almost all jurisdictions has been to…

Entreprises et Big Data: peut-on forcer les entreprises à partager leurs données non-personnelles (par des licences obligatoires ou des licences „FRAND“)?

In the digital age where big data is of key value, companies generate a massive amount of data and make intensive use of data. Given that companies may depend on the access to non-personal data (industrial data) held by other companies to remain competitive, the question arises as to whether companies should be forced to share their non-personal data with each other (B2B data sharing) on the…

Le fonds de placement contractuel immobilier et la Lex Koller

This contribution discusses the treatment of Swiss real estate funds under the Lex Koller. It explains that for­eigners (in the meaning of Lex Koller) may acquire fund’s units and/or shares or participation certificates in the capital of the fund management company (up to full holding) without a Lex Koller authorization. The analysis takes into account the consequences of such purchases on future…

Seuils d’intervention ou examen ex post pour le contrôle des concentrations dans les marchés digitalisés?

Digital markets are open in principle. But network effects may rapidly favour the first successful entrant and establish high entry barriers for followers. In addition, the exchanges are often valued in data access rather than in traditional money terms. These characteristics challenge our merger control regimes. Mandatory notification systems are particularly vulnerable since merger projects in…