Suchergebnisse für market control

Eigentümerstrukturen von Schweizer Aktiengesellschaften

The ownership structure of a corporation is in many respects a crucial determinant from a corporate governance perspective. In finance and business economics, a large variety of theoretical and empirical work has focused on corporate ownership structures and their implications. In the legal field, however, the topic has been rather neglected so far. This article provides an empirical study of…

Praktische Problemfelder und Lösungsansätze in Bezug auf die «FinTech»-Bewilligungsvoraussetzungen von Art. 1b BankG

The piece at hand addresses in depth the FinTech license according to art. 1b of the Swiss Banking Act (BA) that is in force since January 1^st 2019. The FinTech license provides for a new category of a regulatory status for FinTech institutions that do not offer typical banking activities, but whose business touches certain elements of banking. It aims to foster innovation in the financial market…

Compliance-Anforderungen für Schweizer Asset Manager alternativer ­Investmentfonds

The European Directive 2011/61/EU (AIFMD) was a reaction of the European legislator to the financial ­crisis of 2007/2008. The Directive aims to provide for a harmonized and stringent regulatory and supervisory framework for the activities within the EU of all Alternative Investment Fund Managers (AIFM). Due to its fund manager focused approach, AIFMD imposes authorization requirements and…

Stimmrechtsaktien und andere bevorzugte Aktien

There are many ways to grant privileges to specific categories of shareholders and one can distinguish between financial privileges and privileged voting rights in the general assembly of all shareholders. In future, this is to remain unchanged, and accordingly the November 2016 draft of Swiss Law on corporations does not propose any decisive modifications. With regards to the new rules for…

Wer kontrolliert die Aktiengesellschaft?

In Switzerland as in other countries, there is a perennial debate relating to the question of who controls a listed company, and whose interests a corporation should serve: the largest shareholders, minority shareholders, or other stakeholders? And what is the influence of management or the recent phenomenon of proxy advisors on decision-making in listed companies? The author analyzes the issues…

Proxy Advisory – eine Standortbestimmung

With the growing interest of institutional investors in Swiss listed companies the influence of proxy advisors has also risen. This, in turn, has led to a wave of non-binding regulations or guidelines and, more recently, to proposals for binding statutory rules addressing those aspects of the proxy advisory industry which for years have been the target of international criticism. The author takes…

The squeaky wheel gets (all) the grease: Wie weit soll und darf der Verwaltungsrat auf aktive Aktionäre eingehen?

Over the course of this enquiry, we shall examine whether the squeaky wheel does actually get all the grease and what this means for the modern public company. Art. 717 of the Swiss Code of Obligations states that shareholders are to be treated equally under equal conditions. However, said equality is not to be understood in absolute terms but has to be reasonable and justifiable with regard to…

Proxy Advisors – Fluch oder Segen in der Corporate Governance?

The role of proxy advisors in the governance of listed companies has triggered criticism ranging from “box ticking” to “empty voting” and has sparked an intense debate on how to address these concerns. The author takes the view that – for the time being – proxy advisors are not a topic for the regulator. Many institutional investors owe their beneficiaries a fiduciary duty based on which they are…