Suchergebnisse für Unternehmensübernahmen

Alea iacta est: keine erleichterte Fusion bei indirekten Beteiligungsverhältnissen

Alleinaktionär der A AG (Beschwerdeführerin, nachfolgend: übernehmende Gesellschaft) ist B. Die Gesellschafter der C GmbH (nachfolgend: übertragende Gesellschaft) sind B (60% des Stammkapitals) und…

Salärgovernance und neues Aktienrecht

In determining the compensation of directors and top management, the board of directors of public companies is faced with a structural conflict of interest. The aim to mitigate this conflict through an appropriate design of the procedure forms the essence of the say-on-pay rules introduced by the Swiss electorate in a public vote in 2013 and implemented on a transitional basis in the Ordinance…

Prospektrechtliche Gleichbehandlungspflicht bei Ausnahmen von der Prospektpflicht

In the absence of a duty to publish a prospectus, art. 39 of the Swiss Financial Services Act (FinSA) obliges offerors and issuers to treat investors equally when providing them with material information on a public offer of securities. This provision is applicable in cases in which securities are offered to the public or admitted to trading on a trading platform if the obligation to publish a…

Können Investitionskontrollen für gleich lange Spiesse sorgen?

Amidst global protectionist tendencies and in view of major takeovers by foreign state-controlled companies calls for increased public control of foreign investment have been getting louder around the globe. Most recently, the Swiss parliament approved a motion obliging the Swiss government to prepare a draft bill regarding foreign investment screening. Apart from national security concerns,…

Das Kapitalband im neuen Aktienrecht

On June 19, 2020, the National Council and the Council of States adopted the revision of the Swiss law on companies limited by shares. This article deals with the capital band («Kapitalband») that introduces the possibility for shareholders to authorize the board of directors to increase and reduce the share capital without previous resolution by the general meeting. In line with an…

Kartellrechtliche Fragen bei der Gründung eines Joint Ventures

Opening up new markets or pursuing major projects can often only be achieved with partners, which is why companies form joint ventures. When planning and implementing such cooperation projects, economic and contractual considerations are in practice the main focus. However, the influence of antitrust law on this form of cooperation should not be underestimated. The relevance of antitrust law is…

Trois modèles de contrôle des investissements transfrontaliers

The screening of foreign investment has become a growing concern for many countries. In the midst of a trade war between the US and China as well as issues related to state-owned companies’ interference in the EU, it is bound to become a subject of heated debates in Switzerland. As we continue to live through a global pandemic, some countries are seeing themselves lacking or at least vulnerable…

Generalversammlungen von AG: «Landsgemeinden» oder «Chatrooms»?

Digitalization will cause a fundamental change regarding general meetings of Swiss stock corporations. Currently, Swiss corporate law provides that shareholders must be physically present, or validly represented at a general meeting and may not participate in writing or by electronic means; the «COVID-19 regime», however, allows e.g. «cyber general meetings». The new Swiss law on corporations,…

Transparenz von Aktionärbindungsverträgen und Gesellschafte­r­bindungsverträgen in Kapitalgesellschaften

A shareholders’ or members’ agreement is a contract concluded by some or all shareholders or members of a company, eventually with the involvement of the company itself, in order to arrange their legal position complementary to or differing from the relevant company law framework. Although dogmatically diverging, the contractual provisions and company law norms often form a unity. However,…

Uneasy lies the head that wears a crown – Zur Rolle des Verwaltungsrates in schweizerischen Publikumsgesellschaften

The board of directors of a Swiss public company is stuck between a rock and a hard place. Shareholders breathe down directors’ necks with earnings expectations, but the results are delivered by an executive management under the board’s control rather than by the board itself. The executives who run the business on a day-to-day basis know the company better than the board. This allows them to…