Aktienrecht

Sacheinlage- und Sachübernahmevertrag

The contribution in kind agreement is a contract not specifically classified in the Swiss Code of Obligations (CO). According to the prevailing legal opinion the contribution in kind agreement has to be interpreted in line with contractual instead of company law principles. It is widely recognised that the contribution in kind agreement has a close affiliation with the contract of exchange. Based…

Fusions-, Spaltungs- und Vermögensübertragungsverträge aus Sicht der Gesellschaft und der Gesellschafter

The Federal Act on Merger, Demerger, Transformation and Transfer of Assets (Merger Act) contains the minimal contents of the merger agreement, the demerger agreement and the transfer of assets agreement («the reorganisation agreement»). In addition, the Merger Act regulates which bodies of the involved companies have to give their consent to the reorganisation agreement and in which form to…

Der Aktionärbindungsvertrag: Einfache Gesellschaft oder Innominatvertrag?

The present article shows that shareholders agreements are not as of necessity general partnership agreements. As a rule they are rather innominate contracts for which the same rules apply as for nominate contracts, in particular re the questions of consensus, interpretation and amendments. In this respect the real will of the parties is relevant in the first place and only in the second place…

Der Gründervertrag

Founder contracts are contracts in which the founders agree on founding a corporation and commit themselves to perform activities in view of this purpose. The founder contract may be qualified as a contract sui generis containing elements of social law and contract law. In order to determine the applicable law the following foundation phases have to be distinguished: In the preliminary phase when…

Les avantages (statutaires) particuliers de l’art. 628 al. 3 CO : ­une alternative méconnue aux conventions d’actionnaires

Swiss Company Law provides for a «one size fits all» form of limited by shares companies. The underlying idea is that the articles of association can be customized in order to fit the needs of each particular case. On the other hand however flexibility is limited, in particular due to the fact that besides payment of an emission price for their shares, the articles of association cannot put any…

Vorbereitung und Durchsetzung von Aktionärsklagen: Wie kann die Informationsasymmetrie überwunden werden?

In order to improve the enforcement of directors’ liability in solvent companies, it is necessary to improve the access of shareholders to information in order to prepare a derivative suit. The Swiss company law revision project of 2016 provides such improvements by lowering the conditions under which a special audit can be appointed by the court (art. 697a seq. CO). However, the applicants…

Editorial | Éditorial

Am 13. Juli 2017 fand in Zürich die dritte SZW-Tagung zum Aktienrecht statt, in deren Zentrum Kernfragen des neuen Aktienrechts standen. Die aus den Referaten dieser Tagung hervorgegangenen Beiträge bilden den Schwerpunkt der vorliegenden Nummer.

Finanznotlagerecht

The Bill of 2016 for a revision of the Swiss Corporation Law addresses, with new and quite lengthy dispositions, the thorny problem of corporate reorganizations in the event of upcoming financial difficulties. On the one hand, the classical and quite formal equity-related ­approach of European Continental Law to prevent ­«unlawful trading» is maintained, i.e. the Board’s duty to take immediate…

Financement intragroupe et Cash Pooling : Quelle évolution ?

Cross-financing between affiliated companies, a subject at the heart of a group’s strategy, is a daily reality that remains largely ignored by current law and jurisprudence. The latest developments in court decisions seem to increase the discrepancy between the economic needs of the group and the legal requirements for protection of capital of each entity. Thus, since the Swisscargo ruling of the…

Salär-Governance

2017 was a special year for Swiss listed companies. Several compensation reports met fierce resistance from shareholders and proxy advisors, and in one case, a binding vote on executive compensation was rejected. The 2017 proxy season has shown that shareholders do not appreciate compensation models in which osten­sibly pay and performance are not related. Also, the season has shown that over…